Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
Economic Research Institute Study Papers

Economics and Finance

1997

Price Dispersions in Auction Markets: A Case Study of the Cattle
Auction Markets
Gertrude S. Muwanga
Utah State University

Donald L. Snyder
Utah State University

DeeVon Bailey
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri

Recommended Citation
Muwanga, Gertrude S.; Snyder, Donald L.; and Bailey, DeeVon, "Price Dispersions in Auction Markets: A
Case Study of the Cattle Auction Markets" (1997). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 136.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/136

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Economics and Finance at DigitalCommons@USU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Economic Research
Institute Study Papers by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu.

4'l-~{p " "0
Utah Agricultural Experiment Station

PUBLICATION APPROVAL FORM
The Experiment Station will pay a maximum or $500 for page charges and a maximum or 100 reprints (without covers)
only if a manuscript has been assigned a journal paper number. Attach one double-spaced copy of the manuscript to this
fonn for review. The manuscript mUst also include an acknowledgement or support* by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station.
(Please type or print legibly)
TItle _______P_r_ic_e_D_is_p_er_sl_
"°_ns_l_
"n_A_u_c_ti°_n_M
__&_k_et_s:_A__C_as_e_S_m_d_y_o_f_C_att_l_e_A_u_ct_io_n_M
__
&_k_et_s________________

"M
__u_w_w_g_~~~
___
D_o_na_ld__
L_"S_n_y_de_r_\_~
___~
__~_V_~
___~
_'__~____________________
Authors ______G_e_m_u_d_e_S_
American Journal of Agriculmral Economics
ProposedPbceofPublioIDon ______________________________________________________
__
Report or Project No.

023
Fund
Journal Paper No. ( Q()~
(Costs of grant-supported pUblication should come out of grant funds.)

' ted page charges fior your paper. ____________
$65/page x 12 pages
__ = $780
Estuna
(The manuscript must be accompanied by a copy of the journal's fee schedule or it will be returned.)
If reprints are not included in the page charges what is the cost for 100 reprints? __________________________

!

If ordering .... than 100 ~ pi.... give the account number for additional copies.

Departmental

Approvai.J

__

-,

~

Date

I

t;M;,!:J:-7

Editorial Approval)
Date _ _ _ _ _ __
(Please allow severnI days for editing.apd review. ~author should employ bibliographical citations,
abbreviations"aod""~uscriot.fr6'm recomm~ded by the journal.)
Director's Approval

I

Date

~.x;h

Submit papers to the jou~ after approval. The manuscript must be resubmitted for
Experiment Station approval if publication is delayed for more than 12 months from
original submission date.
Submit reprint orders to the UAES Inrormation Office for payment Reprints will be delivered directly to the author.
Four (4) copies should be sent to the UAES Inrormation Office upon receipt We will NOT pay for reprints that have not
been ordered through the Infonnation Office or that have not been assigned a journal paper number. Galley proofs are
usually returned to the journal separately from orders to avoid delays.
UABS Information Office
Utah State University
Logan. UT 84322-4845
(801) 750-2206

*This research was supported by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, Utah 84322-4810.
•
Approved as jomnal paper- 110.

Price Dispersions in Auction Markets:
A Case Study of the Cattle Auction Markets.

by

Gertrude S. Muwanga
Donald L. Snyder
and
DeeVon Bailey
Economics Department
Utah State University
/

August 1997

Price Dispersions in Auction Markets:

A Case Study of the Cattle Auction Markets
Abstract
1', l~

T eTstudy investigated the different factors affecting selected cattle auction prices and
their dispersions to establish the market structure and nature of price equilibria. Overall,
price dispersions were influenced by the season, type of cattle, breed, sex, geographical
location, total number of lots auctioned, price slides, proportions of different cattle
classes, lot size, base weight, type of fles~d type of frame. Prices were highest in
(

winter and lowest in fall. Prices variations were lowest in winter and highest in fall.
Price dispersions were more peaked in fall and least peaked in summer. Price equilibria
were monopolistically competitive, monopsonistically competitive, or purely competitive))
depending on the cattle class and auction considered. These results indicated that sellers
may benefit if they sold their cattle through auction markets.
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Introduction

According to Garbade and Silber (1976), the assumption of a unique equilibrium price
vector has been enormously useful in economics. However, such a simplification may
not be practical depending on the nature of price equilibrium (or dispersion) in a
particular market.

ROthSChild~~ld that no single equilibrium is valid for all situations,

some are characterized by a single price while others are characterized by a dispersion of
prices. Different researchers have come up with different theories of price equilibrium
depending on the underlying assumptions. Such equilibria include: perfect competition
\'\.';t(J-

(Fisher), single price equilibrium with price dispersions due to imperfect information
~l

~l

markets (Stigleh , pure monopoly (Diamond), monopolistically competitive equilibrium
with price dispersions (Salop and

Stiglit~

1977), and noisy monopoly associated with

price and quality dispersions (Salop 1977).
't't0

According to Braverman~ the nature of the differences in consumers' search costs
determine the type of equilibrium for a homogenous commodity. The excess capacity
theorem holds without reservation for a monopolistically competitive equilibrium with a
single price. The consequences of imperfect information being excessive entry,
significant fixed costs and redundant scale opportunities. A model of price dispersion
arises mainly because of the existence of uninformed customers in the market. Persistent
imperfect information is a consequence of ignorant customers (arising from the birth of
ignorant and death of informed customers) and/or slow diffusion of information relative
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to the life time of firms. A perfectly competitive equilibrium, if it exists, would be the
unique Betrand-Nash equilibrium.
Salop and Stiglitz (1977) analyzed the dispersion associated with firms which had
the same production technology, which would require all the stores or firms to charge the
same price. They assumed that consumers could obtain exactly the same information but
at a cost, i.e., imperfectly informed consumers could become exactly informed if they
invested some resources (such as time and money). Their discussion indicated that such
conditions would lead to a monopolistically competitive equilibrium with price
dispersions, even though the firms produced identical commodities. Grossman and

( q:r 3)
Stiglitz (1976) and MortenseJ indicated that incomplete information can cause markets to
adjust incompletely to exogenous shocks.
Although market information may have the largest effect on the type of price
dispersion that persists, other factors such as supply and demand functions, income level,
type of market economy, type of commodity, liquidity services, quality differences,
services provided with the good, as well as market power, could also have a significant

~q1d1-d)ed the degree

.
·l·b·
.
. d·IsperSlons
Impact
on pnce
and/or equII
na. B utters a

0f

centra1··
Izatlon,

the homogeneity of the goods traded, the type of services provided jointly with the good,
the number of actual or potential buyers and sellers, the volatility of parameters affecting
supply and demand, the time span of the market, and the geographical location of the
market.

4
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Garbade and Silber (1976) reported that price dispersions in the u.S. Treasury
,....-

market were influenced by market supply and demand conditions as well as the specific
( L'11'0

characteristics of the securities. Marvel indicated that market price dispersions of
gasoline at a point in time, and the variability of price over time depended on a set of
proxy variables representing the benefits and costs to consumers of acquiring information
and the specific geographical location of the gasoline station.
Snyder (1984a, b) and Muwanga and Snyder (1997), extended the subject of price
dispersions to primary markets. Muwanga and Snyder (1997) compared the price
dispersions of retail and primary markets, and the implications for market structure in
both cases. Their empirical work for six cattle classes indicated that price dispersions
over time were negatively skewed for all the price series. They concluded that the buyers
generally had the market power, implying a monopsonistic cattle market, over time. In
that analysis, all the price dispersions were more peaked than the normal
dispersion-suggesting that price information was relatively available to the market
participants and that they were generally well-informed. The price dispersions for these
six cattle classes were found to depend on the weight of the animal, geographical
location, and type of cattle. Their results further concluded that while cattle buyers
typically determined the highest price they would offer, most sellers tried to obtain the
highest prices the buyer would offer by engaging in search activities. The skewed, but
peaked, price distributions were considered a consequence of well-informed
(competitive) seller but buyer--dominated (monopsonistic) market, over time.

"5

However, results holding over time, may not exist at a point in time and they may
also, be different depending on the type of market investigated. The objectives of this
paper are to determine the nature of price dispersions for cattle at a point in time using
auction data; to establish the resulting implications for market structure and/or price
equilibria for such a market; and to identify other factors (such as type of cattle, season of
auction, origin of animals, and other lot characteristics such as base weight, weight
variance within a lot, presence of horns, frame, flesh, implant, number of animals per lot,
price slide, et

I

that influence the specific characteristics of the price distributions.
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production costs,and concluded that the variance of price distributions increased for the

l~~0

U~f~

Stigler model, but eventually decreased for the McCall model as the intensity of search
Increases.

/

Price Dispersions and Market Structure
lq~

Hence, price dispersions can and do exist (MacMinn), such dispersions may characterize
an equilibrium condition, and characteristics of these dispersionsmay have implications
<tll~

for market structure. Stiglei indicated that the level of skewness contained relevant
information with respect to market competitiveness. He argued that asking prices in retail
markets would be skewed to the right because retail proprietors tend to have a minimum
(l~~)

but no maximum limit on the acceptable price. Marvel argued that efficient markets
should have narrow price dispersions with low variances at a point in time but wider
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dispersions with higher variances over time. Wider dispersions would be expected over
time because sellers serving well-informed customers would make a big effort to search
for any changes in the market conditions. Garbade and Silber 1976 argued that
participants in non-competitive markets would be more likely to pay different prices for a
homogenous commodity compared to those in competitive markets. They indicated that a
peaked (leptokurtic) price distribution would be characteristic of prices drawn from a
market with well-informed participants, while a flat (platykurtic) distribution would be
characteristic of prices drawn from a market with ignorant or less-informed participants at
a point in time. Garbade, Pomrenze, and Silber (1979) reported that an inverse
relationship existed between dispersions of retail market prices and the quality and
reliability of information they contain at any point time.
Snyder (1984a, b) indicated that either the seller or the buyer could establish the
price for a primary market. According to Muwanga and Snyder (1997), efficient primary
market prices would be expected to have non-skewed, mesokurtic price dispersions, over
time. Such a condition being characteristic of well-informed participants who operate in
a competitive market where prices are determined by supply and demand conditions.
Inefficient primary markets would be expected to have large variations (compared to the
efficient market), and skewed price dispersions at a point in time, but small variations
(compared to the efficient market) and skewed, price dispersions over time. Price
dispersions would be expected to be negatively skewed if the buyers had the market
power (monopsony power) because they would have a limit on the highest price they
7

./

could offer, but none on the lowest price. Similarly, the price dispersions would be
expected to be positively skewed if the sellers had the market power (monopoly power)
because they would have a limit on the lowest price they can accept, but none on the
highest price. The more peaked the price dispersion, the more informed the participants
and the more competitive the prices.

Price Dispersions, Price Equilibria, Hypotheses ~and an Empirical Model

41

The overall nature of the price dispersions is thus very informative about the nature of the
price equilibrium that persists. A monopolistically (monopsonistically) competitive
equilibrium with price dispersions would be indicated if the price dispersion was skewed
to the right (left) and peaked with high variability over time. A monopolistic
(monopsonistic) equilibrium with price dispersions would be indicated if the price
/

dispersion was skewed to the right (left) but no peaked, with high variations. A
competitive equilibrium with price dispersions would be indicated if the price dispersion
was normal with high variations. A purely monopolistic (monopsonistic) equilibrium
would have distinct clumps of prices spread on the right (left) side of the dispersion
indicating that they charge (pay) different prices to different customers, while a purely
competitive equilibrium would be the unique Betrand-equilibrium with little or no price
variations.

--

8

Hypotheses and Empirical Price DispersiOlt 1odels (Over Time)

tR

Hence, the dispersion of prices should be larger the greater the instability of supplydemand conditions over time. Price variations are expected to be greater for those
auctions performed on days or months when the levels of cattle prices are changing
significantly. For any given auction, price dispersions are expected to be greater for the
particular type of cattle whose price is changing most rapidly. In addition to dispersions
characteristics, other factors might also be expected to influence the nature of price
dispersions. Such factors might include volume (VOL) in terms of number of lots
brought to the auction, average slide (ASLD), average size of lot (ALSIZE), percentages
of different types of animals [i,e., percentage of steers (%STR), percentage of heifers
(HFR) or percentage of others cattle classes (OTR)] at the auction, average base weight
per lot (ABWT), number of geographical locations (NLOC) represented at the auction,
number of breeds (BRD) represented, season represented by the quarter in which the
auction took place (SEASON), and the absolute price change

(A~P)

between different

auctions. The reduced form model in equation (1) is used to obtain the parameter
estimates.
(1)

D = f(VOL, SEASON, ABWT, ASLD, %STR, %HFR, %OTR, NLOC,
ALSIZE, BRD, A~P)

where D is a measure of dispersion. The dispersion characteristics to be considered
include average prices per auction, Pi; the d h root of the d h moment about the average
price for n = 2, 3, 4, and the range of prices, Ri .
9

J

The signs are expected to be negative on the of VOL (the greater the volume, the
more competitive the prices and the lower the price dispersion) and ABWT (the prices of
lighter animals are more competitive than the prices of heavier animals because there
more outlets for lighter animals). The signs are expected to be positive on the
coefficients of ASLD (the greater the variations of prices of different size animals, the
bigger the value of the slide), NLOC (price dispersions may be expected to vary between
regions), ALSIZE (the larger the number of animals per lot, the greater the variability of
prices), BRD (different types of breeds are associated with different monetary values),
and AdP (price variations are expected to be greater with shifting supply and demand
conditions). The signs of the remaining parameters are really empirical questions that can
not be stated a priori.
/

Empirical Price Model (Point in Time)

tj{

For a given auction, prices of cattle are expected to be a function of specific lot
characteristics such as the base weight (LBWT), variability of the weight within the lot
(L V AR), lot slide (LSLD), lot size (LSIZE), percentage number of animals delivered for
viewing (%DEL), geographical location (LOC), type of flesh (FLS), type of frame
(FRM), class of cattle (TY), presence or absence of horns (RO), and whether the animals
are implanted or not (IMP). Equation (2) summarizes this functional form.
(2)

PR = f( %DEL, LSIZE, LSLD, LBWT, LOC, FLS, FRM, TY, RO, IMPL)

10

Data

4

The data used in this study were taken from information provided by a Video Cattle
Auction Station. The livestock sales were performed "Via Satellite" from Superior Ft.
Worth, Texas. Sample sales were drawn from 38 auctions, of which 8, 1 j and 20
auctions were performed in 1993, 199 Jand 1995, respectively. All the cattle were sold
on a sliding scale for a given weight over and above the base weight, with all cattle being
weighed on certified scales and sold FOB the ranch, unless otherwise stated. The data
included geographical locations, auction date, price (cwt), month of delivery (month),
price slide (cts), number of animals per lot, the number of lots auctioned for a specific
date, the base weight (lbs), cattle type, type of breeds, and quality variables such as flesh
and frame, among others.

Empirical Estimations

r;P--

41. The results are presented in three sections. Section 1 deals with the factors affecting the
~

overall nature of price dispersions for the 38 auctions. Section 2 deals with the factors
that affected prices for the auction conducted on September 3, 1993, as a case study.

b

Section 3 summarizes the empirical implications of price dispersional characteristics for
market structure and price equilibrium. In all cases, significance was based at the 5%
level, unless otherwise stated.

11

Section : Factors Wfecting Price Dispersion I~t Auction Markets
r~

'l'

Equation 1 was estimated for the mean, median, minimum, maximum, range, standard
deviation, skewness and kurtosis using data from 38 auctions

ab/J. -3 , inclusive).

Seasonal variations were captured using dummy variables DSS 1, DSS2, and DSS3 for
spring, summer, and fall quarters, respectively. Winter quarter served as the reference for
seasonal activities. Annual variations were captured using dummy variables DYI and
DY2 for 1994 and 1995, while 1993 served as the reference.

1

Mean price. The results in equation (3) (table 1) indicated that the mean prices
offered for cattle increased by $0.02, $1.10, $0.17, and $0.53 as the lot size, base weight,
price slide, number of locations, and price differences between auctions increased,
respectivel . but decreased by $1.63 as the number of breeds auctioned increased. The
/

fact that price differences were significantly different between auctions indicates that
mean price levels varied between auctions. The mean prices of cattle in spring, summer,
and fall were $4.12, $9.07 and $15.37, respectively, lower than those in winter. Prices in
1994 and 1995 were $17.59 and $28.11, respectively, lower than those in 1993,
respectively.

Median price. Equation (4) (table 1) shows that the median prices offered for
cattle increased by $0.12, $0.04, $2.34, $O.l ~d $0.43 as the lot size, base weight,
average price slide, number of locations, and price differences increased, respectivel
decreased by $1.82 as the number of breeds auctioned increased. The median prices of
12

cattle in spring, summer and fall were $4.23, $9.10 and $14.87, respectively, lower than
those in winter. Prices in 1994 and 1995 were $17.57 and $27.44, respectively, lower
than those in 1993.

Maximum price. Equation (5) (table 1) shows that the maximum prices offered
for cattle increased by $0.17, $1.23, and $0.29 as the lot size, price differences between
auctions, and average number of lots for cattle classes other than steers and heifers
increased, respectively. Unlike the mean and median prices, the maximum prices were
not significantly affected by the base weight, slid ) nd number of locations. The
maximum prices of cattle in spring, summer, and fall were $4.18, $10.32, and $20.73,
respectively, lower than those in winter. Prices in 1994 and 1995 were $17.46 and
$36.77, respectively, lower than those in 1993.

Minimum price. Equation (6) shows that the minimum prices offered for cattle
decreased by $3.98 and $0.60 as the number of breeds auctioned and average number of
lots for cattle classes other than steers and heifers increased, respectively. The minimum
prices were not significantly affected by the base weight, price slide, number of locations,
average lot size, and price differences. The minimum prices of cattle in spring, summer
and fall were $5.76, $10.70, and $32.31, respectively, lower than those in winter.
Minimum prices in 1994 and 1995 were $28.44 and $30.74, resp6ctv ly, lower than those
in 1993.

13

The above results indicated a downward trend over time, consistent with the
current cycle position. The mean and median prices were significantly influenced by the
average lot size, the season (as represented by the month and year of the auction), the
average base weight, the average price slide, the number of locations and breeds
represented at the auction, as well as price difference between auctions. The maximum
price offered was significantly influenced by the lot size, season, price differenc . and
number of lots for cattle classes other than steers and heifers. The minimum price was
significantly influenced by the season, the number of breeds, and the number of lots for
cattle classes other than steers and heifers.

Price range. The price range increased by $0.63 as the percentage (proportion) of
lots of cattle classes other than steers and heifers increased (equation (7), table 2). The
price range increased by $0.21 and $6.20, respectively, as the average lot size, and
number of breeds increase; but decreased by $0.08 as the average base weight increased.
The results indicated that heavier animals were associated with smaller price dispersions
in comparison to lighter animals, smaller size lots were associated with smaller price
dispersions when compared to larger size lots, and that different breeds were offered
different prices. The season did not have any significant effect on the price range. The
dummy variable for 1995 was significant, while that for 1994 was not significant
implying that the price range in 1995 was $21.594 smaller than those for 1993 and
1994-indicating smaller price dispersions in 1995 compared to 1993 and 1994.
14

/

Standard Deviation. The standard deviation increased by $0.69 and $0.152 as the
number of breeds auctioned and price difference increased, respectively, implying that
price variations were not the same for different breeds and auctions (equation (8) in table
2). The standard deviation decreased by $0.03 as the average number of lots for steers
increase ; increased by $0.20 as the number of lots for cattle classes other than steers and
heifers increaseJtbut was not significantly influenced by the number of lots for heifers.
Hence, price variations were smallest for steers, followed by heifers, and were highest for
prices of other types of cattle. Neither the seasons nor the year had a significant influence
standard deviation-indicating that price dispersions did not vary between seasons and
years.

---

~

Skewness. The skewness of the price distributions decreased by 0.01, 0.44, 0.01,

and 0.266 units as the average base weight, average slide, average lot size, and number of
breeds auctioned increased, respectively (equation (9), table 2). Only the dummy
variable for fall was significant and negative-implying that the price distributions in fall
were more skewed than those in winter, spring, and summer. These results suggest that
large size lots were associated with less skewed price dispersions relative to smaller size
lots, heavier animals were associated with less skewed price dispersions compared to
lighter animals, and the bigger the price slide, the less skewed the price dispersion. The

R2 was generally low for this equation implying that there were other factors which
influenced the skewness of the price dispersion.
15
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Kurtosis or peakedness. The peak of the price dispersion increased by 0.03 as the
number of lots for steers increased, but decreased by 0.03 and 0.06 as the number of lots
for heifers and those for cattle classes other than steers and heifers increased, respectively
(equation (l0), table 2). While the coefficient for number of lots for heifers was not
significant, those for the number of lots for steers and other classes of cattle were,
suggesting that price information was not as readily available for heifers compared to
steers and other classes of cattle. The results indicate that the frequency of marketing
may have had a significant influence on price dispersion-the higher the frequency, the
more peaked the price dispersion and the lower the price dispersions, and vice versa,
although no effort was made to draw the line of what would be considered to be high
frequency and low frequency.
Only the dummy variables for summer was significant and negative-indicating
that the peaks of the price dispersions were the same during winter, spring, and fall
seasons, but 1.96 units less peaked during the summer. This result implies that market
participants were more aware of market prices in winter, spring, and fall compared to
summer quarter.
The peak of the price dispersion decreased by 0.02 as the average lot size
decreased-indicating that sellers searched more for prices of smaller size lots compared
to huge size lots whose offer prices were generally higher than those for small size lots.
As a result, huge size lots had both higher offer prices and larger price dispersions. The

16

dispersion peak decreased by 0.08 as the price difference between auctions increased,
implying that the price changes over time led to greater search. The R2 for this equation
was generally low implying that there are other factors which influence the availability of
price information, howev

-

that was beyond the current question.

t\Vf
Section'l Factors Affecting Price Dispersionr t a Point in Time

l'

fi

Equation (2) was estimated for the auction conducted on September ] 3, 1993. A total of

vr<N-"

G

f

633 lots, of which 421, 180,4,2, 1, 6, 9, 1 ) and 110t(s) were for steers, heifers,
replacement heifers, bulls, cows and calves, sprayed heifers, bred heifers, and mixed
steers and bulls, wef@--rep-F0seRtea-trespectively. Only two dummy variables for the cattle
class were included in the model, i.e., DTY1 = 1 if steers, zero otherwise; and DTY2 = 1
if heifers, zero otherwise. The overall average lot size was 120 animals per lot. Of the
/

eight breeds and 633 lots auctioned, 517 and 70 lots were English exotic and English
cross, respectively. Other breeds included Hereford, Cross, Angus, Exotic cross, Dai )
and Mexican. Only two dummy variables were included for the breed, i.e., DBR1 =1 if
English cross, zero otherwise; DBR2 = 1 if English exotic, zero other wise. Out of the
3~

thi

~

locations represented that day, dummies were included for onltsYiocations,
If)

based on the rule that at least ten lots had to be located in a given region for it to be
included in the model. Dummy variables DUT, DCa, DTX, DWY, DKS, DNE, DNM,
DM~nd

DSD were included for Utah (28 lots), Colorado (90 lots), Texas (44 lots),

Wyoming (77 lots), Kansas (13 lots), Nebraska (21 lots), New Mexico (41 lots), Montana

17

(24

lot~and

South Dakota (20 lots), respectively. The lots were either large (191 lots),

medium (437 lot

or small (5 lots). Two dummy variables were included for the type of

frame, i.e., DFRI = 1 if large frame (191 lots), zero otherwise; and DFR2 = 1 ifmedium
frame (437 lots), zero otherwise. The reference was the small frame category. Two
dummy variables were also included for the type of flesh, i.e., DFLSI = 1 ifheavy flesh
(34 lots), zero otherwise; DFLS2 = 1 if medium flesh (530 lots), zero otherwise. The
reference was the small flesh category (69 lots).
One dummy variable was included to capture the effect of weight variability for a
given lot, i.e., DV AR= 1 for even (uniform) weight lots (385 lots), zero otherwise. One
dummy variable was included for horns, i.e., DHO =1 if horned (31 lots), zero otherwise;
and for implant, i.e., DIMP = 1 if implanted (370 lots ), zero otherwise. The estimated
parameters are presented in equation (11), table 3.
The offer prices for cattle increased by $1.00, $1.70, and $0.52 as the lot size,
number of animals delivered and the price slide increased, respectively. The offer price
for even (uniform) weight lots was $0.98 higher than that for uneven weight lots. The
offer price for homed animals was $1.24 higher than that for dehorned animals. The offer
price decreased by $0.04 as the base weight of the lot increased. Steers and heifers had
generally lower offer prices compared to all other classes of cattle. The offer price for
steers and heifers were $5.04 and $7.32, respectively, lower than those offered for other
classes of cattle, ceteris paribus. As expected heifers were offered a price which was
lower than that for steers. Offer prices for this auction were highest for those lots in
18
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Colorado, followed by lots in Nebraska, Wyomin and Kansas; and were lowest for those
lots located in

Texas,~he parameter estimate for offer prices in Texas was not

significant.
Largezand medium~frame animals were offered a price which was $3.70 and
$3.48, respectively, lower than that offered for small frame animals, and medium flesh
animals were offered a price which was $0.98 lower than that offered for light flesh
animals, while that offered for heavy flesh animals was not statistically different from that
offered for light flesh animals. The offer price for English exotic breeds was $1.80 lower
than that offered for all other breeds. Whether the animals were implanted or not did not
significantly affect the offer price.

~

;'

Section i : Price Dispersion and Implication~ or Market Equilihrium /
I

4t
1\. t\

9-/

I

Steers and heifers were represented in all but one auction, while other classes of cattle
were represented in only 27 of the 38 auction samples considered. Table 4 shows the
summary of the dispersion characteristics for the combined data regardless of the class of
cattle. Prices of cattle were as low as $40.50/cwt and as high as $ 134.5/cwt. The lowest
mean price was $63. 14/cwt, while the highest was $95.92/cwt. The standard deviation
ranged between 1.93 and

13.9~suggesting

that price variations occu d between auctions.

Price dispersion skewness values ranged between -0.09 and 1.65-implying that either
the seller (positively skewed) or the buyer (negatively skewed) establish the price
depending on the market area considered. This empirical finding supports the argument
19

I

made by Snyder (1984). The equilibrium price was determined by the buyer, seller or
both the seller and the buyer for 18.42%, 76.32% and 5.26% of the auctions, respectively.
Overall, the sellers appeared to have the most market power implying a monopolistic
market in most cases.
The price distributions were platykurtic, mesokurtic and leptokurtic for 10.53%,
5.26% and 84%, respectively, with values ranging between 1.70 and 7.60. Price
dispersions were peaked or leptokurtic for most the part, implying that price information
was readily available for most of the auctions. Only a few cases were found to exist
where price information was evidently not readily available. The null hypothesis of a
competitive price dispersion was rejected for 81.58% but was not rejected for 18.42% of
the auctions. These results indicate that price equilibria at a point in time for auction
markets were mostly monopolistically competitive equilibria with dispersions, with only
a few cases of monopsonistically competitive or competitive equilibria with price
dispersions, implying that sellers typically had the greater market power at a point in time
for auction markets.
Whether the same structure holds for other auctions andlor other times is
essentially an empirical question. However, Muwanga and Snyder (1997/.') ho dealt with
time-series data on regular cattle markets, reported monopsonistically competitive
~

l\

equilibria with price dispersions,' over time. These two studies indicate that sellers tend
to have greater market power at a point in time for auction markets, while buyers have
more market power over time for the regular markets. Also, since the equilibrium prices
20

/

could be established by either the seller, the buyer or both, supply and demand conditions
had a role to play.
Table 5 summarizes the dispersional characteristics by cattle class. Offer prices of
steers were as low as $51 and as high as $134.08, those for heifers were as low as $50.25
and as high as $124, while those for all other classes of cattle were as low as $40.5 and as
high as $121. Basing on the mean values for the different auctions, steers had the highest
offer prices ($64.13-$97.85), while heifers had the lowest offer prices ($61.13-$93.63).
Mean values for offer prices of all other classes of cattle ranged between $61.78-$95.39.
Based on the average standard deviations, prices of heifers had the lowest average
price variations (a

=

5.78), followed by steers (a

the highest average price variations (a

=

=

7.65), while other classes of cattle had

8.99). It is also important to note that prices of

cattle classes that were neither steers nor heifers had both the lowest and highest price
variations, likely because this category was composed of so many different classes of
cattle.
Price dispersions were associated with skewness values ranging between -1.21
and 1.39 for steer ; between -0.99 and 2.963 for heifer; and -1.94 and 1.67 for all other
classes. Monopsony, competitiv 7 nd monopoly power were indicated for 18.92%,
8.11'Y<

d 72.97% of the auctions for steers; 8.11 %, 2.7% and 89.19% of the auctions for

heifers; and 37.4%,

3.7~

nd 59.26% of the auctions for other classes of cattle,

respectively. Overall, these findings indicate that monopoly power dominated the auction
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markets for steers and heifers. For the other classes of cattle both the seller and the buyer
had reasonable market power.
The price dispersions had kurtosis values that ranged between 2.08 and 7.02 for
steer ; 1.88 and 18.01 for heifer; and 1.00 and 6.36 for other classes of cattle. Price
dispersions were platykurtic for 29.73%,

24.32 ~

nd 77.78% for steers, heifer J nd other

cattle classes, respectively, but were leptokurtic for 70.27%,

75.68 ~)jd

22.22% for

steers, heifer . and other classes of cattle. These results imply that sellers of steers and
heifers were more informed (relatively peaked price distributions) and more likely to
obtain the same price compared to those of other classes of cattle. This is a t11
consequence of the different supply and demand conditions for the different cattle classes
sold through the auction markets.
The null hypothesis of a competitive price dispersion and/or competitive
equilibrium price was rejected for 70.27%,

67.57~ ) and

14.81 % of the auctions for steers,

heifer 2and other classes of cattle at the 10% level of significance. We failed to rej ect the
null hypothesis of competitive price dispersion and/or competitive equilibrium price for
29.73%, 32.40o/?>nd 85.19% of the auctions for steers, heifer~d other classes of cattle
at the same level of significance.

Conclusions

a

The study investigated the nature of price dispersions for 38 auctions. Price dispersions
were influenced by the type and/or the class of cattle, geographical location, breed of
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cattle, season of sale, volume in terms of the number of lots sold, and lot characteristics
such as the price slide, the proportions or average number of lots for different classes of
cattle, number of animals per lot, and the base weight. Price dispersions at a given
auction were influenced by the number of animals delivered, the type of flesh and frame,
and whether the animals were homed or dehorned. Different auctions were associated
with different price dispersions. Overall, the auction markets for steers and heifers were
dominated by monopolistically competitive price equilibriums with price dispersions,
while those for other classes of cattle were dominated by competitive price equilibriums
with price dispersions. Although rare, cases of monopsonistically competitive
equilibrium with price dispersions existed for heifers and steers. T_hese results indicate
either the seller or the buyer or both could establish the equilibrium price for cattle
auction markets. Prices in winter were the highest, while those in fall were the lowest.
Also, prices in winter had the smallest variations and were relatively peaked, while those
in fall had the largest variations, but also tended to be peaked.
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Table 1. Parameter Estimates for the Mean, Median, Minimum and Maximum
Prices for Cattle Auction Data
ariablelEqu-;tion Number~

- -Oepen ent

Constant

ABWT
ASLD
NLOC
ALSIZE

BRD
ADP

Mean Price
Eg.3

Median Price
Eg.4

Maximum Price
Eg.5

Minimum Price
Eg.6

77 .58
(4.955)**
0.018
(1.896)**
1.095
(1.572)**
0.168
(2. 146)***
0.106
(3.637)**
-1.629
(-3 .009)**
0.527
(4.815)**

55 .71
(3.237)**
0.038
(3.694)**
2.339
(3.055)**
0.152
(1.768)**
0.12
(3.427)**
-1.819
(-3 .056)**
0.434
(3 .605)**

112.93
(6.98)**

115 .29
(14 .141)**

DSS2
DSS3
DYI
DY2

R2
F -statistic
Probability

-3 .982
(-4.158)**

-4.118
(-4.401)**
-9.074
(-8.465)**
-15.374
(-6.567)**
-17.592
(-7.784)**
-28 .111
(-12.332)* *

-4.231
(-4.115)**
-9.103
(-7.726)**
-14.868
(-5 .778)**
-17.572
(-7 .074)**
-27 .444
(-10.953)**

1.231
(3 .916)**
0.294
(1.543)**
-4.18
(-1.282)*
-10.319
(-2.86)**
-20.733
(-2 .229)**
-17.459
(-1.968)**
-36 .77
(-3.959)**

0.972
79.147

0.966
65.261

0.823
16.286

0.735
11.872

o

o

AOTR
DSSI

0.167
(1.959)**

o

o

~Values

-0.595
(-6.196)**
-5 .755
(-3.564)**
-10.698
(-4.808)**
-32.312
(-7.121)**
-28.441
(-6.657)**
-30.737
(-6.875)**

_ otes:
in parenthes% are t-statistics. Significance levels of 5% and 10% are indicated by ** and ),'fespectively.
The variable AOTR represents the average number of lots for cattle classes other than heifers and steers ar a given
auction.
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates for the Range and Standard Deviation of Prices
Dispersions for Cattle Auction Data
Dependent Variable/Equation Number}'
Range
Eg.7
Constant
ABWT
ALSIZE

Standard Deviation
Eg .8

45.773
(2.455)**
-0.08
(-2.882)**
0.211
(2.48)**

2.721
-0.79

6.196
(4.194)**

0.69
(1.725)**
0.152
(2.22)**

ASLD

BRD
ADP
%OTR

Skewness
Eg .9

Kurtosis
Eg .I0

11.342
(4.003)**
-0.008
(-3.989)**
-0.011
(-1.748)**
-0.441
(-3.483)**
-0.266
(-2.62)**

5.903
(3.246)**

-0.077
(-1.352)*

0.6265
(4.49)**
0.031
(2 .724)**
-0.031
(-1.423)*
-0.056
(-1.967)**

-0.026
(-3.262)**

ASTR
AHFR

0.202
(5.314)**

AOTR
AR(l)

-0.451
(-2.412)**
-0.031
-0. 156
-0.081
-0.35
-0.738
(-3.168)**

-0 .841
(-1.466)*
-1.962
(-2.511)**
0.304
-0.43

2.211
-0.76
-21.594
(-8.936)**

0.187
-0.279
1.51
(1.344)*
2.388
-1.129
3.342
(1.517)*
1.456
-0.678

0.834
20.845
0

0.767
9.882
0

0.564
5.533
0

0.325
1.684
0.147

DSSI
DSS2
DSS3
DYI
DY2
R2
F-statistic
Probabili~

(

-0.02
(-1.216)

are t-statistics. Significance levels of 5% and 10% are indicated by ** and~espeCtivelY. The
variable AOTR represents the average number of lots for other classes of cattle at a given au ·on. AR(l) is an
autoregressive term. The variables ATR, AHF~,nd AOTR represent the average number of lots for steers, heife
and for other classes of cattle at a given auction, respectively.

J

~values in parenthes'
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Table 3. Results for Equation 11 (Dependent

~riable

is Prices)

Independent
Variables

Parameter
Estimates

Independent
Variables

Parameter
Estimates

Constant

121.550
(27.441)**
0.017
(1.430)*
0.01
(3.443)**
0.522
(2.982)**
-0.042
(-13.137)**
-5 .042
(-3.741)**
-7.319
(-5.765)**
-3.702
(-1.494)*
-3.485
(-1.422)*
-1.124
(-0.118)
-1.796
(-2 .114)**
0.300
(0.248)
-0.98
(-1.369)*

DVAR

0.984
(2.048)**
1.239
(1.118)
-0.466
(1.021)
3.187
(2.494)**
6.344
(6.910)**
-0.152
(-0.137)
5.475
(5.632)**
5.135
(3.112)**
5.634
(4.078)**
2.173
(1.980)**
2.593
(1.974)**
3.392
(2.401)**

DEL
Lsize
LSLD
LBWT
DTYI
DTY2
DFR1
DFR2
DBR1
DBR2
DFLS1
DFLS2

DHO
DIMP
DUT
DCO
DTX
DWY
DKS
DNE
DM
DMO
DSD

R2 = 0.658

F = 48.813

Values in parenthes

are t-statistics. Significance levels of 5% and 10% are indicated by ** and ) espectively.

N = 633
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Table 4. Summary of the Dispersion Characteristics for the Combined Data
Maximum

Minimum

Standard
Deviation

Skewness

Mean

Median

KUl10sis

Lowest

63.14

63.00

79.00

40.50

1.929

-0.871

1.704

Average

77.59

76.94

102.53

55.33

7.841

0.401

36.905

Highest

95.92

95.75

134.50

70.60

13.98

1.648

7.600

/
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Table 5. Summary of the Cattle Price Dispersion Characteristics
Mean
- - -------

Median

Maximum

Minimum

--=-=-------- -

--------------- - - ----------- -

Standard
Deviation

Skewness

Kurtosis

-------------

------------

------------

Steers
Lowest
Average
Highest

64.129
79.26
97.85

64.05
78.44
97.50

79.00
102.08
134.50

51.00
59.65
77.25

1.854
7.648
11.309

-1.207
0.373
1.389

2.077
4.023
7.022

Heifers
Lowest
Average
Highest

61.13
75.53
93.63

61.50
73.92
93.00

66.85
92.82
124.00

50.25
64.45
77.00

1.254
5.782
10.582

-0.986
0.786
2.963

1.881
4.386
18.006

61.78
75.60
95.39

60.60
75.54
91.50

60.50
90.07
121.00

40.50
59.22
85.00

0.693
8.985
19.71

-1.942
0.197
1.668

1.000
2.609
6.357

Other Classes
Lowest
Average
Highest .
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